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ABSTRACT
(Expected) adverse effects of the ‘ICT Revolution’ on work and opportunities for 
individuals to use and develop their capacities give a new impetus to the debate on the 
societal implications of technology and raise questions regarding the ‘responsibility’ of 
research and innovation (RRI) and the possibility of achieving ‘inclusive and sustainable 
society’. However, missing in this debate is an examination of a possible conflict 
between the quest for ‘inclusive and sustainable society’ and conventional economic 
principles guiding capital allocation (including the funding of research and innovation). 
We propose that such conflict can be resolved by re-examining the nature and purpose 
of capital, and by recognising mainstream economics’ utilitarian foundations as an 
unduly restrictive subset of a wider Aristotelian understanding of choice.
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1. Introduction
The strenuous purposeful money-makers may carry all of us along with them into 
the lap of economic abundance. But it will be those peoples who can keep alive, 
and cultivate into a fuller perfection, the art of life itself and do not sell themselves 
for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the abundance when it comes.
– J M Keynes (1930) Economic possibilities for our grandchildren.
The ‘ICT Revolution’ – in particular the integration of artificial intelligence, 
robotisation, nanotechnology and bioengineering − may prove far more 
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disruptive and divisive than technological revolutions of the past. If human 
labour is ‘on the way out’, what will happen − asks Porter (2016) along with 
many others − if the economy no longer provides an income for the majority 
of people? ‘How will the economy spread money around’ so that people can 
afford to pay their necessary expenses (Porter 2016)?
‘A once “stupid” concern gains respect’, claims Porter, remindful of the Luddite 
rebellion of 1811. Aware of the problem, policy-makers justify their policies with 
reference to the ‘inclusive and sustainable society’ they will bring about, espe-
cially through technological breakthroughs and a continual launching of new 
products that may meet new demand and create new work,1 even when this 
goal seems increasingly elusive.2 The prospect of technological mass unemploy-
ment also raises questions regarding the ‘responsibility’ of technology and inno-
vation; however, to date the debate on ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’ 
(RRI)3 has paid scant attention to such questions.
As we argue in this paper – taking ICT as an example – ‘inclusive and sus-
tainable society’ may prove impossible to attain unless we examine a possible 
conflict or paradigmatic inconsistency between the ethical outcomes that are 
aimed at and the normative economic principles that have been assigned to 
give direction to economic behaviour, in particular to the allocation of capital. 
It is time to ask, therefore: When we demand ‘inclusive and sustainable society’, 
what is our theoretical basis? How do ethical societal aims relate to the principles 
that guide capital and influence which initiatives are and which are not funded?
If, as we aver, the main aim or motive of human beings is to use and develop 
their capacities, and if the criterion for ‘inclusive and sustainable society’ is the 
degree to which it gives individuals opportunities to so do, then the question 
posed in the beginning would become: how will the economy ‘spread money 
around’ to support individual’s initiatives, enabling them to use and develop 
their capacities? As we explain in this paper, the utilitarian foundations of today’s 
mainstream economics, and the normative prescriptions derived from them, 
1e.g. european commission (2013, 2011), world economic forum (2009).
2in principle, both product innovation (technological breakthroughs such as the steam engine, electricity, 
the automobile, and communication and information technology) and process innovation (a new division 
of labour) tend to displace labour. However, historically, product innovation has often had secondary 
effects (such as the creation of railroads, highways and communication networks) so that the labour that 
was displaced as a result of process innovation could find new work. in contrast, today’s ‘icT revolution’ is 
expected to accelerate job loss and to result in a net reduction in work (e.g. acemoglu and Restrepo 2017; 
frey & osborne 2013; Spence 2014; vogel et al. 2015). in countries with limited social welfare arrange-
ments, information and communication technology (icT) may result not in a net reduction in work but in 
individuals whose labour is obviated being forced to accept work in low-quality services (e.g. Hassel 2011) 
or ‘alternative work arrangements’ (Katz and Krueger 2016). See also case and Deaton (2017) for data on 
increased morbidity and mortality (‘deaths of despair’) as a result of ‘cumulative disadvantage’ triggered 
by ‘progressively worsening labour market opportunities’.
3while the terms ‘responsible innovation’ (Ri) and ‘responsible research and innovation’ (RRi) have received 
particular visibility in an e.U. policy context (e.g. https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/
h2020-section/responsible-research-innovation), they are heirs to earlier discussions in europe and the 
U.S.a. about research integrity and the wider dimensions and societal implications of science and inno-
vation (e.g.owen, macnaghten and Stilgoe (2012); owen, Bessant and Heintz (2013). 
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do not allow for the freedom in the allocation of money or capital that such 
‘spreading around’ would require.4
The consequences become visible (as we explain) in three related phenom-
ena: (a) an (unqualified) acceleration of the replacement of human physical and 
increasingly also routine mental labour by technology, in particular ICT; (b) a 
corresponding rise of ‘excess liquidity’ or ‘superabundant capital’,5 or the growth 
of a financial surplus that does not have an immediate use in physical produc-
tion;6 and (c) a displacement of original, creative mental work (as distinguished 
from routine mental labour), possibly resulting in a reduction in the power of 
the human mind, itself arguably the source of all progress.
If technological progress continues unchecked, the result may be a ‘future 
[that] doesn’t need us’ (Joy 2000). A solution to unbounded technological pro-
gress requires a reconsideration of capital and indeed of progress itself. As we 
explain, the three phenomena reflect an underlying structural change in soci-
ety – namely, a growing non-material economy relative to the (conventional) 
physical or material economy – and a failure to recognise the nature, let alone 
deep significance of this evolution.
The aim of economic activity is traditionally said to be to provide for the mate-
rial livelihood of human beings – an end that is hardly controversial. Technology 
contributes to this end in two ways: by contributing to the development of 
products that make life easier (‘product innovation’), and by improving pro-
duction processes (‘process innovation’). As we take hold of economic life by 
way of invention and innovation, we further the division of labour (between 
human beings, and between human beings and machines), which tends to 
make work lighter. Labour-saving technological progress belongs to the stand-
ard course of history, whereby humanity has always made efforts to alleviate 
and where possible eliminate the ‘drudgery’ of life. To date, this advance in our 
condition has mainly concerned physical or manual and, more recently, also 
routine mental labour.
Nowadays, however, it is extended even to original, creative mental capac-
ities. A risk involved in the ‘new technologies’ including ICT taking hold of 
mental activity is that not just the production and transportation of goods, but 
also spheres which depend wholly on the human mind (science, education, 
health care, the judiciary) are put out of balance by an impersonal engineering 
approach that increasingly displaces thinking, conscious, cultural activity includ-
ing discretional judgement making.7 As even original, creative mental activity 
4‘free’ in ‘free market’ refers to negative freedom, or freedom from obstacles to the pursuit of self-interest (or 
the maximisation of profit or shareholder value), on the assumption that overall welfare will be maximised 
when capital is used in ways that maximise profits or shareholder value (rather than human capacities).
5e.g. Rüffer and Stracca (2006), Bain and company (2012a).
6Besides labour-saving, icT is also capital-saving. icT-based technology tends to become both more powerful 
and cheaper over time (elsby et al. 2013; lawrence 2015). any cheapening effect of icT on capital will 
add to the financial surplus.
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is increasingly displaced by technology – a process in which profit-maximising 
capital plays a significant role − technological progress threatens to undermine 
the source of all progress. With its curious disregard of the further development 
of human capacities, in particular creative mental capacities, society appears 
to be undermining its own foundation.
It would be possible to create economic space for the use and further devel-
opment of human capacities if the financial surplus referred to above, or more 
specifically the capital that is freed from production by the productivity growth 
that arises from technological progress − a consequence of the growth of human 
knowledge, ingenuity and consciousness − were linked to the further growth of 
human capacities.8 However, this is unlikely to happen without a corresponding 
evolution in theoretical frameworks, in particular a widening of our understand-
ing of economic freedom. In this paper, we sketch an approach that provides 
grounds for a wider concept of freedom based on an Aristotelian understanding 
of choice that would provide a theoretical basis for ‘linking capital to capacities’.
The basis of this wider concept of freedom is threefold: philosophically, a 
full conception of the end or telos of human life – here understood as the full 
development of human capacities, and more specifically ‘character’9 in accord 
with Aristotelian eudaimonia; economically, an understanding of capital as hav-
ing a dual role, regarding production and telos; and technologically, innovation 
shaped in accordance with the values and tasks of the sphere for which it is 
designed, or sphere-appropriate technology.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present data for the 
Eurozone for the period 1970−2007 which show how labour-saving techno-
logical progress – a consequence of the continuing growth of human intel-
ligence and consciousness – has reduced the hours of labour needed in the 
production of goods required for material existence. Simultaneously, work that 
creates non-material value (such as education, science, the arts, health care, the 
judiciary, and so on, typically known as ‘services’) has increased correspond-
ingly. However, as a result of today’s focus on maximising financial returns to 
capital, these activities (hitherto considered ‘non-market’) are opened up to 
financial capital on precisely those conditions, leading to a one-sided focus 
on expense reduction involving standardisation, automation and robotisation 
and the displacement of original, creative mental work. If the financialisation 
and consequent computerisation of these mental activities continues routinely, 
and hence unchecked, the result will be an acceleration of technological un(der)- 
employment; moreover, there is a real possibility that it will also undermine the 
(further development of the) human mind. However, both results are by no means 
7Think, for example, of the idea of replacing judgement with rules in finance, on the grounds that subjectivity 
will usurp the ‘objectivity’ of algorithms and statutes.
8a solution discussed in Houghton Budd (2011), naastepad and Houghton Budd (2015).
9aristotle (2000).
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inevitable; they depend on how we shape technological change. But how much 
freedom do we have in choosing sphere-appropriate technology in a social context 
which permits only solutions that are in agreement with the normative prescriptions 
of today’s mainstream economic theory?
In Section 3 we address this question, which has two aspects. First, what does 
freedom amount to in the context of conventional economics? Second, if our 
understanding of freedom were widened to include the possibility to choose 
between alternative socio-technological trajectories, how would alternatives 
that today are rejected because they do not meet ‘benchmark’ financial returns 
be financed? When, as a result of the application of human intelligence to pro-
duction processes,10 labour is obviated, the money that was used to remunerate 
the now obviated labour also becomes free. Using this money, or freed capital, − 
the money that is freed from production by human intelligence − to enable 
those whose labour is obviated to further develop and use their capacities, we 
suggest, would solve three problems simultaneously – technological unemploy-
ment, the riddle of ‘super-abundant capital’, and the possible atrophying of the 
human mind if it is not active (due to an overdose of ICT).
In Section 4, we explain that using ‘freed capital’ in this way depends on an 
extension of the Benthamite-utilitarian perspective on the end or purpose of 
human life (homo economicus). From this will follow also a purpose for capital 
and technology, which will enable the human being to give direction to both. 
We discuss an Aristotelian view on the central driving force in human life which 
leads to a view on the purpose of the economy as providing the material condi-
tions that enable people to, in Aristotle’s terms, ‘live well’ and do ‘fine actions’, in 
short, to realise their telos or purpose. If capital and technology were recognised 
as belonging to both – material conditions and the telos of human life – freed 
capital could fund the growth of human capacities required to realise such telos, 
which would then also become the criterion for responsible use of technology.
In Section 5 we propose that the corresponding widening of today’s narrow 
(Benthamite-utilitarian or Friedmanite) concept of freedom – as the principle 
to guide the allocation of capital − starts with making visible the ‘invisible hand’ 
that is believed to coordinate the self-interested actions of atomistic individuals 
into a harmonious whole. An alternative to this semi-conscious, deistic concept, 
we suggest, would be a conscious combination of the strengths of the two 
conventional approaches to the problem of social order − the private initiative 
of the market and the coordination hitherto entrusted to the state – based on 
a concept of freedom that includes responsibility for others; this, however, does 
not come automatically and requires ethos or ‘character’.
As an aid in this process, the individual will need guidelines for judgements 
concerning the responsible use of capital. Focussing on ICT, Section 6 gives a first 
10See, for example, adam Smith’s well-known illustration (quoted in Baetjer and lewin 2007) of the embod-
iment of knowledge in early steam engines.
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sketch of an approach for judging the responsibility of research and innovation 
(a requirement for making judgements about which research and innovation 
should and which should not be funded), based on Aristotelian freedom and 
grounded in Aristotle’s notion of the ‘golden mean’. The Aristotelian idea of a 
telos for human life (eudaimonia or the ‘good life’) implies that mere instrumental 
reasoning is insufficient; it involves intrinsic virtues and skills, the precise forma-
tion of which, however, is up to the individual. Positive freedom, then,11 is not 
freedom from constraints on satisfying (material) desires, but rather freedom to 
shape one’s own implementation of the good life according to one’s own talents 
and conscious choices. This constitutes a first step towards a practical integration 
of the three dimensions of our approach: the philosophical (the human telos), 
the economic (a wider concept of capital) and the technological (culminating 
in ‘sphere-appropriate technology’). Section 7 concludes.
2. The elimination of human labour … and the human mind?
As human intelligence takes hold of production processes, it tends to make 
work lighter. As a result, labour is obviated worldwide. In the present social 
and economic set-up, the obviated labour tends to take the form of either un- 
employment or being without work, or under-employment (the transference 
of those whose labour is obviated into low-skill, low-paid jobs).12 When, due 
to ongoing innovation, production requires progressively less labour, it will be 
ever harder to achieve inclusive economic, social and cultural existence through 
growth in production.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which gives data for hours spent labouring in 
the countries of the Eurozone between 1970 and 2007. Figure 1 gives data for 
the physical aspect of economic life, i.e. the goods-producing economy.
As Figure 1 shows, humanity increasingly liberates itself from the need to 
work for material livelihood only. In just 37 years, GDP in the ‘physical economy’ 
has more than doubled, while the hours worked declined.13 This rather spectac-
ular saving of labour is the result of applying human intelligence to labour, due 
to which labour becomes more effective (the productivity of labour rises).14 As 
a result, a person working one hour in 2007 could produce nearly three times 
as much GDP in 2007 as would have been the case in 1970.
This growth in productivity entails a choice: as productivity increases, one 
can either produce the same level of output with less labour, or one can keep 
11compared to negative freedom; see footnote 5.
12See footnote 3.
13more precisely: GDP increased by 143 per cent in the period 1970−2007, while hours worked declined 
by 17 per cent.
14labour-saving technological change (also known as labour-enhancing or labour-augmenting technological 
change) typically derives from process innovations (adding capital to labour), which increase effective 
labour (Jones 1981).
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labour constant and produce a higher level of output. This gain in terms of 
either additional goods (which may raise living standards) or a reduction in 
the working day (permitting us to pursue other dimensions in life), is called the 
productivity dividend (e.g. Schor 1993). As Figure 1 shows, the countries of the 
Eurozone have used their productivity dividend in part to reduce hours of work, 
and in part to increase GDP per person. The goods that are needed are produced 
by progressively fewer people, and as a result, a growing part of the labour that 
used to be needed to produce goods is no longer needed for that purpose.
If we look at these data from the point of view of ‘inclusive growth’, and the 
E.U. strategy to achieve it (‘growth, growth, growth’),15 what do we see? Arguably, 
an aspect of a society that regards itself as ‘inclusive’ is the opportunity it gives 
to its citizens to participate in society through work. According to the European 
Commission, ‘inclusive growth’ can be brought about by ‘a larger and more pow-
erful manufacturing sector’ which would ‘control costs and labour demands’ 
through rising productivity. However, if ‘inclusive growth’ is to be achieved 
through increased productivity, or a reduction in labour required per unit of out-
put, how fast would output have to grow to compensate for the declining labour 
requirements per unit? Hours of work will remain constant only when output 
grows at a rate equal to the rate of productivity growth. The faster the growth 
in productivity, the higher must be the rate of growth in production in order to 
compensate for the labour thereby obviated. On the basis of the data given in 
Figure 1. Hours spent labouring to produce eurozone GDP, 1970−2007.
note: Period 1970−2007: from the first year of the KlemS database (1970) until the year before the beginning 
of the financial crisis.
15‘if the eU economy is to return to the path of sustainable and inclusive growth and find solutions to the 
pressing societal challenges of the 21st century, we need a larger and more powerful manufacturing 
engine to take us there’ (european commission 2013: 3, 4).
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Figure 1, the output of Eurozone manufacturing and other goods-producing 
sectors would have to triple every 37 years to keep hours per person constant!16
Even if such a strategy were realistic from the point of view of ecological sus-
tainability, it is increasingly likely to meet with another phenomenon: saturation 
of demand. As living standards increase, and material needs are increasingly met, 
the demand for goods levels off − as can already be observed in the richest parts 
of the world today − thus reducing the potential for growth of the traditional 
kind, based on goods production and ‘jobs’ creation.
There are two main signs that suggest that demand is levelling off. One is the 
continual invention of an endless stream of new commodities in an attempt to 
influence and shape the tastes and preferences of consumers. In part, innova-
tive activity meets true needs, but in part it may also point to a development 
described as ‘want creation’ by John Kenneth Galbraith in his book The Affluent 
Society.17 This includes now familiar phenomena such as launching new versions 
of existing commodities that render older, but still functional, versions obsolete. 
For instance, new software that is incompatible with older hardware makes it 
impossible to keep using older hardware that is technically in good working 
order but rendered obsolete by the new inventions, a phenomenon known as 
planned obsolescence (e.g. Slade 2007). Another sign is the remarkable growth 
of money spent on increasingly sophisticated and often unscrupulous adver-
tising techniques (e.g. Schor 2005). Such phenomena suggest that a strategy of 
promoting economic growth in order to offset the obviation of labour is likely to 
run into a boundary set by human beings’ eventually limited need for material 
goods18 − a limit which reduces not just opportunities for, but perhaps also the 
very need for further growth.
In sum, therefore, a strategy relying on low-cost growth in the manufacturing 
sector to bring about ‘inclusive society’ is increasingly likely to face two con-
straints. The first is the reduced need for labour in goods production, or ‘jobless 
growth’ – that is, a continuation of growth (supported by a continual introduc-
tion of new goods with the help of product innovation) but at increasingly lower 
levels of employment (due to labour-saving process innovation); the second is 
a saturation of demand which could prevent further growth altogether. That is 
the ‘bad news’, in terms of work.
But is it really bad news? Productivity growth implies that the task of the 
economy – i.e. to produce the goods which people need for their material 
16assuming constant population growth. at higher rates of population growth, output would have to increase 
even faster to keep hours per person constant.
17Galbraith (1958 [1999]) argued that producers of goods and services create ‘wants’ instead of satisfying 
‘needs’, and predicted someday the process would fail. companies seduce consumers to buy goods they 
don’t really need, and today these are often offered and bought on credit; a major problem lays in the 
mushrooming (and ever-riskier) debt incurred to pay for it.
18of course, one can point to worldwide poverty and economic deprivation, but not on aggregate. Those 
are the result of maldistribution, not insufficient productive capacity.
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existence – is achieved with progressively less labour. In principle, this opens 
up new possibilities. As humanity increasingly liberates itself from the need to 
work only for material livelihood, it becomes free to pursue other aims in life.
Indeed, as Figure 2 shows, hours that were obviated in the production of 
goods have been used to support the growth of education, science, health 
care, the arts and so on, in short, the creation of non-material value. The more 
productivity growth frees human beings from the physical and routine mental 
labour required to provide for material existence, the more they are free to take 
on original, creative mental work.
Is this the significance of the obviation of labour in production: that it frees people 
to pursue new aims in life? Intellectual work, the creative activity of the mind, of 
understanding and consciousness, implies continual expansion. If, as Aristotle 
said in the famous opening sentence of his Metaphysics, ‘by nature, all men long 
to know’ (a point of view that will be discussed further below), then humanity 
finds its meaning in the development of the powers of the mind, whose devel-
opment then becomes the very point of human existence.
Cultural activities such as education, research and health care, besides 
being valuable in themselves as a source of reflection and consciousness, also 
contribute to economic life as the intelligence that invents new products and 
production processes, educates people, and takes care of justice and people’s 
health. It is thanks to the intelligence that is embodied in physical capital, and 
Figure 2. Decomposition of eurozone GDP growth in ‘services’ in terms of hours and labour 
productivity, 1970−2007. 
note: including ‘financial services’ under ‘mind’ or ‘intelligence’ may come as a surprise, in view of their 
contribution to the onset of the financial crisis. However, ‘mind’ does not necessarily mean ‘good’; ideas can 
also be wrong. Therefore, how we educate the mind is crucial.
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to the intelligence of good teachers, doctors and judges that people can be 
productive in their work; intelligence makes labour more effective. This intelli-
gence is, ultimately, the capital of society19 (as in the expression: ‘the capital of 
a business is ideas’).20
Indeed, there will increasingly be physical-capital-saving innovations (Lowe 
1988: 98); capital will increasingly consist of ‘mind’ (such as the intelligence that 
writes computer code; e.g. Benzell et al. 2015; Sachs and Kotlikoff 2012) rather 
than matter. To build these diverse forms of capital, however, people are needed; 
hence the rise of hours of work in cultural activities.
So far, so good. Today, however, the common understanding is that work 
in these areas should disappear as well, because, as is often said, its costs are 
becoming ‘too high for the economy to bear’ (e.g. Bain and Company, 2012a, 
2012b). The solution suggested by policy-makers to deal with ‘typically low-pro-
ductivity services such as health care and personal services’ 21 is productivity 
growth with the help of ICT (standardisation, automation, robotisation). Health 
care, education, research, the judiciary, even art – so the argument runs – should 
be reorganised following the example of manufacturing and other goods-pro-
ducing businesses where, over time, costs have been successfully reduced 
mainly through the obviation of labour.
Shortage of funds due to decades of tax reduction and the ‘bank bail-outs’ 
during the financial crisis have led governments to increasingly allow domains 
such as research, education, health care and jurisdiction to be ‘opened up 
to the market’ on conditions set by the latter. In health care, standardisation 
(‘protocollisation’), automation and robotisation of aspects of diagnosis and 
treatment that hitherto were the province of doctors is introduced as part of 
attempts to reduce expenses and raise profits. As Bain and Company (2012b) 
make clear, such measures are an important condition for capital owners to enter 
the so-called ‘health care market’: ‘To win in a shifting profit pool, companies 
need to improve how healthcare is delivered’.
Breaking down ‘cognitive’ jobs into smaller and smaller tasks with the help 
of data-processing technology opens the way to automation of ‘white-collar 
work’, including legal, medical, teaching and research professions; according 
to Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) 40–50 per cent of white-collar jobs is likely 
to disappear within the next 10 years. Frey and Osborne (2013) speak of 47 per 
cent of job categories being open to automation within two decades and this 
concerns mainly mental work. When, in this way, human intelligence becomes 
increasingly displaced by technology, entire realms within which human beings 
19e.g. wilken (1982), Daastøl (2011).
20The importance to the economy of intelligence (ideas, education) is acknowledged also by new growth the-
orists; see Romer (1990, 1993, 1994), Jones (2002), Jones and Romer (2010); alvarez et al. (2013). However, 
new growth theory tends to treat the growth of human intelligence (‘human capital’) as instrumental in 
the creation of material value (higher economic growth) rather than also a value in itself.
21european commission (2013) European Competitiveness Report 2013. Towards knowledge-driven rein-
dustrialisation, p. 118; see also figure 1.18 on p. 28.
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typically develop and exercise their mental capacities may no longer offer such 
opportunities.
There are many examples of more or less dystopian or even apocalyptic 
images of what too much emphasis on technological advancement for com-
mercial purposes may lead to, even, perhaps surprisingly, in writings by people 
who significantly contributed to technological progress themselves. In his article 
‘Why the future doesn’t need us’, for example, Bill Joy (cofounder and chief sci-
entist of Sun Microsystems until 2003) considers a vision of a future society in 
which human work is no longer necessary and the majority of people are seen 
as ‘superfluous, a useless burden on the system’. ‘Our most powerful 21st century 
technologies − robotics, genetic engineering, and nanotech − are threatening 
to make humans an endangered species’, Joy (2000) comments.
Cowen (2013) envisions a bifurcation into a small group of workers with skills 
highly complementary to machine intelligence, who take ever more advan-
tage of machine intelligence, and the rest, whose skills have been mastered 
by computers and who will see their prospects shrink. The impact of ICT could 
be a reduction in the quantity or the quality of work, or a combination of both. 
Graeber (2013, 2015), for example, sees this in terms of an elite or ruling class 
that keeps control over the lives of others through stultifying low- and mid-level 
‘screen-sitting’ that serves simply to occupy them. He observes an increase in 
jobs
… that are, effectively, pointless. Huge swathes of people, in Europe and North 
America in particular, spend their entire working lives performing tasks they 
secretly believe do not really need to be performed. The moral and spiritual dam-
age that comes from this situation is profound. It is a scar across our collective 
soul. Yet virtually no one talks about it. (Graeber 2013)
ICT replaces work in certain sectors or types of activity and is complemen-
tary to work in others. However, in both cases it tends to take over or displace 
increasingly complex mental work. Work involving complex interaction between 
individuals is automated by standardising processes and translating them into 
specific rules, thus transforming creative human relationships into routine pro-
cedures (Lakshmanan 1989; Pramudita 2015). In the data, this may show up 
as productivity growth or increased ‘efficiency’ (measured as costs per unit of 
output), but how do software and robots compare to (real) doctors, teachers 
and judges in terms of the quality of work?
Adverse effects on human capacities are becoming visible, for example, in 
the computer business systems (CBSs) described by Head (2014) as a fusion of 
Corporate Panoptics (CP), a continuous and pervasive vertical monitoring of busi-
ness processes encompassing all occupational hierarchies, and Business Process 
Reengineering, an equally constant activity of reshaping those processes − based 
on data and Key Perfomance Indicators received through CP − to make them 
run faster. Head concludes that CBSs (a modern version of Taylorist ‘scientific 
management’) in the U.S. deteriorate employee knowledge and experience even 
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in the physical (goods-producing) economy (compared to German skill-based 
systems), because they restrict education, knowledge and high remuneration 
to a narrow layer of management.22 Are individuals really empowered by infor-
mation technology as ‘knowledge workers’ in a ‘knowledge economy’ asks Head 
(2014: 12), therefore; and is the deterioration in U.S. education at all levels related 
to CBSs which are ‘used to marginalise employee knowledge and experience 
and where employee autonomy is under siege from ever more intrusive forms 
of monitoring and control?’
While CBSs reduce capacities even in the goods-producing economy, they 
become ‘outright counterproductive’ (Head 2014) when they are transplanted 
to the cultural sphere. In universities, CBSs create thick layers of bureaucracy 
ruling over what researchers should research and what teachers should teach, 
thus discouraging creative, original thinking (Head 2011). In health care, CBSs 
are used to create protocols where health maintenance organisation (HMO) 
case managers determine how patients are diagnosed and treated, taking over 
the tasks of doctors; the impact will depend on the knowledge and motives 
of managers vis-à-vis doctors (Head 2014). For Head, these are examples of 
misindustrialisation.
According to a growing number of studies, the increased computerisation of 
cultural life is not without impact on the human mind; it reduces our ability to 
learn, memorise and solve problems (e.g. Carr 2014; Hoff 2011; Spitzer 2012). If 
the displacement of the human mind by technology takes place unconsciously, 
it may undermine the very basis for genuine progress (including technological 
innovation), as well as the strategy of reaching inclusive society. And the bitter 
irony is that the problem this would result in implies precisely that it will not 
be recognised as such. So, in Carr (2014)’s words, it is ‘time to regain the art of 
thinking’.
However, the aim of this paper is not to resolve definitively the debate over 
whether or not automation, standardisation and robotisation increase or lower 
the capacities of the human mind. Our focus is, rather, on the question: How 
much space is there to shape technological change in ways that bring about 
inclusive and sustainable society? As we indicated earlier and go on to explain 
in the next section, the imperative of neoclassical economic theory (and modern 
strands of thought based on it) to maximise financial returns on capital plays 
a decisive role in bringing about a particular type of division of tasks between 
human beings and technology.
3. Free to choose? Towards a wider concept of capital
If today’s technological progress is biased towards technological solutions that 
result in unemployment and the suppression of mental life, this is not, we would 
22and this not for economic reasons; according to Head, both types of systems are profitable.
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argue, an inevitable consequence of technological progress. It is a consequence 
of a technology and an economics informed by a narrow (conventional eco-
nomic) conception of progress that focuses on material welfare and does not 
see the value of a free mental life.
A focus on material welfare is understandable in conditions of low living 
standards as prevailed for example in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
Britain where today’s dominant economic perspective emerged. However, in the 
last two-and-a-half centuries these conditions have been modified considerably 
consequent on productivity growth. As Keynes speculated in his 1930 essay 
Economic possibilities for our grandchildren, if average living standards were eight 
times higher in 2030 than in 1930, ‘the economic problem’ would be solved, and 
people would have enough income to turn their attention to other things in life 
besides material existence.
However, at this point in history, what will humanity do, asked Keynes with 
dread:
If the economic problem is solved, mankind will be deprived of its traditional 
purpose. Will this be a benefit? If one believes at all in the real values of life, the 
prospect at least opens up the possibility of benefit. (Keynes 1930: 366)
Beyond the point where mankind has solved the problem which was hitherto 
the ‘primary, most pressing problem of the human race’ – the struggle for sub-
sistence − further accumulation of capital for purposes of expansion of physical 
production would make no sense. Rather, we would ‘devote our further energies 
to non-economic purposes’ (Keynes 1930: 365). However, this would require a 
‘readjustment of the habits and instincts of the ordinary man, bred into him for 
countless generations’ (ibid.: 366), and Keynes asked ‘with dread’ whether man 
would be able to discard such habits ‘within a few decades’.
Almost 90 years after Economic possibilities for our grandchildren, the most 
productive parts of the world have come close to this historical point, at least 
in terms of average incomes.23 At the same time, a novel phenomenon has 
made its appearance which has been named ‘excess liquidity’ (e.g. Rüffer and 
Stracca 2006), ‘superabundant capital’ (Bain and Company 2012a) or ‘cash pools’ 
(Pozsar 2011) – that is, liquidity apparently in excess of what is needed to finance 
investment in the real economy. Are the two phenomena related? Although 
super-abundant capital is notoriously hard to measure – it is variously measured 
as the value of global financial assets (which tripled over the past two decades)24, 
23obviously, a justified objection would be that today many household incomes, even in the rich countries 
of the world, are not sufficient to cover material necessities because, while economic growth has boosted 
incomes per capita in contemporary western societies, median incomes have stagnated (Skidelsky 2010: 
143). most people in western societies earn much less than the average income, and in recent decades 
significant parts of national income have been redistributed from lower incomes towards the top of the 
income scale (Piketty 2014) which cannot be explained by corresponding changes in productivity (Stiglitz 
2013). However, rather than being proof that Keynes was premature in his analysis, distributional issues 
are part of the problem (naastepad and Houghton Budd 2015).
24Bain and company (2012a), figure 1.1.
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financial sector liabilities in excess of GDP,25 growing global institutional cash 
pools,26 or the size of the shadow banking system27 − the idea is that today, 
there exist savings, or liquidity or liquid capital, that do not have an immediate 
use in the economy. What is the counterpart to this capital? ‘Superabundant 
capital’ places economists of various persuasions before a riddle that yet has 
to be solved.
Within the neoclassical model, savings are the source of financing investment 
in the means of production; conversely, investment in the productive base of 
the physical (goods-producing) economy is the raison d’être of savings. But how 
is one to explain an increase in global liquidity? Puzzled by this phenomenon 
(e.g. Pozsar 2011), most neoclassical economists do not ascribe it to the usual 
suspects: ‘market failure’ or inefficiency due to government intervention. It is 
sometimes argued that the increased liquidity is used for hedging and arbi-
traging, and so plays a useful role in resource allocation and investment; but 
this leaves unanswered the question why the economy today requires a much 
higher liquidity-to-GDP ratio than in the past. Moreover, clear empirical evidence 
of positive consequences in the economy of hedging and arbitraging is lacking 
(e.g. Epstein and Crotty 2013).
For Keynesians, increased liquidity reflects that the circular flow of income 
is not closed: not all savings are reinvested in production. What explains this 
‘leakage’ from the circular flow of income? For Keynesians, it reflects the inher-
ent instability of markets (Keynes 1936) due to the existence of fundamental 
uncertainty (Keynes 1923; Knight 1921), or more specifically the rise of the ‘rent-
ier’ (Keynes 1936; Palma 2009) whose ‘liquidity preference’ tends to depress 
investment and increase unemployment. The conventional Keynesian (though 
perhaps not Keynes’s) solution would be to absorb financial surpluses through 
taxation and create work via the state. However, such a solution may be more 
adequate for cyclical unemployment than for the structural obviation of labour 
due to the new technologies.
For Marx(ists), the accumulation of capital in financial markets would 
reflect class struggle over the ownership of surplus capital, or a ‘capital surplus 
absorption problem’ (Harvey 2011: 26). Unfortunately, however, a ‘class-strug-
gle’ approach emphasises what divides labour and capital and eclipses what 
will become increasingly needed over time: awareness of humanity’s common 
interest. It would be possible to step out of the class struggle (that is built into 
modern NAIRU theory and the monetary policy institutions based on it) if labour 
and capital were conceived as mutually reinforcing or supporting (rather than 
opposed): while capital raises labour productivity, the increase in the ‘produc-
tivity dividend’ creates new opportunities for everyone.28 Naturally, this may 
25chen et al. (2012).
26Pozsar (2011).
27Pozsar and Singh (2011), Pozsar et al. (2010; revised 2012).
28e.g. Storm and naastepad (2012), ch. 8.
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entail a significant change in ‘power relations’,29 especially as regards capital 
allocation. However, the main power question, as we explain below, regards the 
power of the individual to take into account the interest of others in addition 
to his own. ‘Class struggle’ is unlikely to overcome today’s familiar stalemate 
positions until we ask not to whom the surplus belongs, but to what it belongs. 
To what purpose is or should it be put? 
Capital super-abundance, we suggest, cannot be understood or adequately 
dealt with unless we understand its relationship with technological progress. 
When labour is obviated by technological progress – an effect of the working 
of human intelligence in production – the money that was used to remunerate 
the now obviated labour is also freed from its current use in production.30 A sig-
nificant part of today’s (and future) ‘super-abundant capital’ arguably originates 
in this money, which can perhaps be called freed capital – money freed by tech-
nological progress, as a consequence of growth in, and increased application of, 
human intelligence in production. But does freed capital, in turn, support the 
further growth of human knowledge, ingenuity and consciousness, to which, 
arguably, it ‘belongs’?
The separation of money capital from the real economy reflects an underlying 
structural change of whose significance we have yet to become fully aware. Driven 
by old ideas and ‘habits’ (Keynes 1930) – in particular, a concept of freedom that 
describes as irresponsible any behaviour of ‘corporate officials … other than to 
make as much money for their stockholders as possible’31 − owners of capital 
continue to use it for maximising financial returns. With only limited high-yield-
ing investment possibilities in a stagnating physical economy, and reduced trust 
in financial markets since the financial crisis, this has led to a growing demand for 
safe investment opportunities elsewhere. Apart from trading in land (von Braun 
and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Deiniger and Byerlee, 2011; Sassen 2014) and com-
modities (e.g. Helbling and Roche 2011; Schmidt 2016), cultural domains such 
as care for physical and mental health, justice, research, and education, hitherto 
considered ‘non-market’,32 are increasingly used as ‘instruments’ for generating 
returns (e.g. Bain and Company 2012b; Berman 2012) rather than protected and 
cultivated as a source of future progress. One of the reasons for ‘old economic 
habits’ invading non-economic realms of society – a phenomenon which has 
been named ‘economic imperialism’ (Fine 2002; Frey 1993; Landes 1961; Lazear 
2000) – is the lack (real or imagined) of other perspectives on these issues.
29as described in, for example, the four volumes of michael mann’s The Sources of Social Power.
30as explained by the late University of freiburg professor of economics folkert wilken. wilken (1982) calls 
this money ‘free capital’, money that is no longer needed in production and therefore free to move on 
to a new destination. ‘freed capital’ can be understood as capital freed by the application of human 
intelligence to production.
31‘few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance 
by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders 
as possible’ (friedman 2002).
32See, for example, european commission (2013): 54.
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In 1930, Keynes was concerned whether, a 100 years from then, humanity 
would find anything more amusing to do than continue to chase money and 
capital:
… for the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent 
problem − how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy 
the leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live 
wisely and agreeably and well (Keynes 1930: 367).
Adherence to a narrow conception of progress would throw up serious problems:
To judge from the behaviour and the achievements of the wealthy classes today 
in any quarter of the world, the outlook is very depressing! (ibid.: 368).
Would humanity recognise ‘the love of money as a possession’ or homo eco-
nomicus for what it is,
a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological 
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental 
disease. (ibid.: 369)
Keynes knew very well that unto itself economic theory does not provide 
answers to the question of humanity’s ‘permanent problem’. He himself hinted 
at qualities of life beyond material existence – suggesting, indeed, that these 
are more ‘real’ than the struggle for material existence itself. However, he failed 
to formulate a full answer, because it seems not to have occurred to him to 
relate the free time that productivity growth would bring – which today takes 
the form of technological unemployment or underemployment − to the capital 
that is also freed by it.33
Unless this freed capital – money freed from its current use in physical pro-
duction as a result of the working of human intelligence, and no longer needed 
in such production − finds a socially and scientifically acknowledged counter-
part, one should not be surprised if, to use Keynes (1941)’s words, ‘loose funds 
sweep round the world disorganising all steady business’. Rather than using the 
money that is no longer needed in production for material welfare, and so is 
free to fund our enjoyment of ‘the arts and values of life’, to paraphrase Keynes 
(1930) and Russell (1935),34 we permit it to enter the cultural sphere in a way 
that reduces its very source (original, creative mental activity) to a ‘cost factor’ 
to be eliminated in order to serve the further accumulation of material (and 
often merely financial) wealth.
33naastepad and Houghton Budd (2015).
34Some of the possibilities opened up by the decline in the hours needed in production for livelihood (thanks 
to the growth of human intelligence) are described by philosopher Russell (1935) as: 
Medical men will have the time to learn about the progress of medicine, teachers will not 
be exasperatedly struggling to teach by routine methods things which they learnt in their 
youth, which may, in the interval, have been proved to be untrue 
and
 Young writers will not be obliged to draw attention to themselves by sensational pot-boilers, 
with a view to acquiring the economic independence needed for monumental works, for 
which, when the time at last comes, they will have lost the taste and capacity.
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Contrary to what could be happening, the imperative of accumulation 
increasingly brings the non-material dimensions of life − previously described, 
for instance by sociologists such as Max Weber35 as belonging to non-economic 
realms, in particular culture – under the sign of profit maximisation. Unless the 
creation of non-material value is seen as both a sign and the source of progress, 
including economic progress, it will, in the end, disappear or be adapted wholly 
to the demands of the current narrow concept of capital, to which however it 
does not belong.36
Before closing this section, it is important to note that not all ‘excess liquidity’ 
or ‘superabundant capital’ is freed capital. Financial capital is continuously gen-
erated from various sources besides productivity growth. Part of the financial 
capital accumulated in the past three decades arguably results from paying too-
low prices for goods and labour (wages), and also, for example, from ‘free riding’ 
on the environment and from speculation. As a result, many households, even 
in the richest countries of the world, cannot fund even their material necessi-
ties. Such liquidity is not truly ‘superabundant’, if by that term one understands 
money that the physical economy cannot accommodate and has no use for. 
It is withdrawn, rather than abundant. It exists because not everyone’s needs 
have been met, not by a long way. Indeed, capital that is formed by withdrawing 
money from these sources is not truly capital, if by capital we mean wealth that 
originates in, or reflects the ingenuity, creativity and inspiration, or productive 
mental activity that gives rise to and guides economic activity.37
Our question with respect to the counterpart of ‘excess liquidity’ regards 
only straightforward economic sources of capital formation, in particular regular 
innovations in production. This capital will continue to be created, and unless we 
identify its counterpart – a counterpart that uses it up rather than preserves it, for 
it will continue to come about – the real possibility exists that it will result in new 
financial bubbles and crises, in addition to technological un(der)employment 
and the suppression of mental activity. For the problem that brings about these 
crises, we suggest, is not the loosening of liquidity, or financial capital, from the 
physical economy per se, but the lack of a perspective which tells us how ‘loose’ 
or ‘loosened’ capital originating in regular (economic) types of capital formation 
can be used, more precisely used up, productively.
Once we realise that the creation of non-material value is as real and as impor-
tant as, if not greater than, the value connected to goods production, ‘freed 
35or more recently in michael mann’s neo-weberian approach (see Heiskala 2016).
36Romer (1990, 1993, 1994) has argued that knowledge, an aspect of culture, can be commercially developed. 
although this may be true for knowledge that, in the short to medium run, yields the demanded financial 
returns, the development of knowledge that does not yield ‘benchmark’ financial returns is likely to be 
neglected (e.g. Berman 2012).
37e.g. Houghton Budd (2011), Daastøl 2011, wilken (1982).
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capital’ can be linked to the further growth of human knowledge, understanding 
and consciousness – or, as we suggest in the next section, to Aristotelian ‘charac-
ter’. Thus, capital would be recognised as serving two purposes rather than one: 
financing the means of production for providing material welfare, and funding 
the growth of non-material welfare, or ‘the real values of life’ (Keynes 1930).38 
If it is important to the human being to use his or her capacities, be educated, 
and be of value to others in this way; that is, if the end or purpose of a human 
being is non-material growth and material growth is a means to this end, then 
capital and technology must serve both.
However, such a wider understanding of capital and technology requires 
a concept of freedom that allows or encourages individuals to allocate capi-
tal to further both purposes. Whether such freedom is perceived as necessary 
depends on one’s perspective on the end or purpose of human life. As noted at 
the outset of this paper, it is on a wider understanding of these three − capital, 
freedom and human life − that a full theoretical basis for ‘inclusive and sustain-
able society’ depends.
4. Capital and character
Unless we arrive at a standpoint from which we can determine a purpose for 
human life, it will prove impossible to define progress and make judgements 
about the responsibility of research and innovation. But such standpoints 
have been rejected at least since the Enlightenment (MacIntyre 1981 [2013], 
2009), and are therefore hard to find both in contemporary economics and in 
philosophy.
Reflections on these issues are, nevertheless, found with some of the found-
ing fathers of the economics discipline and in new lines of research which have 
picked up threads spun by, for instance, Mill, Marx and Aristotle (to take exam-
ples from different colours within the spectrum of economics).
For John Stuart Mill, the ultimate end of human existence is the full develop-
ment of human potentialities (Downie 1966): ‘… the end of man is the highest 
and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent 
whole’ (Mill 1859: 50). Karl Marx’s analysis is conventionally interpreted as an 
analysis of the capitalist system, at whose root lies what he saw as the contradic-
tions of the capitalist system – the commodification of labour and its associated 
alienation. However, rather than the overthrow of the capitalist system, the 
unfolding and development of the individual appears to be primary; ideally, 
therefore, Marx’s theory is first and foremost a philosophy of man (Copleston 
2003).
In emphasising the full unfolding of human nature, both Mill and Marx came 
close to the philosophers of Greek antiquity, in particular to Aristotle, whose 
38an idea also explored in Houghton Budd (2011), wilken (1982), naastepad and Houghton Budd (2015).
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work is also being revived in new lines of research in economics and business.39 
For Aristotle, human beings have a specific nature that determines their proper 
goal or τέλος (telos, end), in life. This goal is εὐδαιμονία (eudaimonia, happiness), 
a term which is also translated as ‘the good life’ or ‘flourishing’. Crucially, eudai-
monia is not the maximisation of anything,40 but consists in the full unfolding 
of human nature, by living as human beings ought to live (we return to this 
in the next section). The end, in the sense of purpose, of any kind of life is to 
develop as fully as possible the full range of potentialities (δύναμις, dunamis) 
that belong to such a life. For most birds, for example, this will include the 
ability to fly, for fish the ability to swim, for trees the ability to be well rooted 
– and for humankind it includes developing the ability to attain insight and to 
act accordingly.41 Thus, eudaimonia, happiness, requires the development of 
all the interdependent elements that it entails. For humankind the elements 
of eudaimonia include the possibilities of acquiring τέχνη (technè, practical 
skills), of developing ἀρετή (aretè, virtue) and of aspiring to ἐπιστήμη (epistèmè, 
knowledge) and σοφία (sophia, wisdom). Reaching one’s telos does not happen 
automatically, however; it requires the development of ἦθος (ethos, a virtuous 
character), or an inner sense of what is right and worthy in human life – which 
is nothing other than consciousness of one’s own telos.42
The history of moral philosophy from the Enlightenment onwards is, as 
MacIntyre paints it, a history of attempts to ground moral requirements in some-
thing other than the human telos, as, for example, ‘Hume attempted to do by 
arguing that moral judgements are grounded in our capacity for fellow-feeling’ 
(Voorhoeve 2009); or Jeremy Bentham, who grounds moral judgements in util-
ity. These attempts, MacIntyre claims, have all failed. He concludes that ‘it is only 
by trying anew to formulate an end for human life in the Aristotelian tradition 
that we can hope to arrive at a standpoint from which we can rationally evaluate 
claims about what is morally required’ (Voorhoeve 2009: 114, 115).
In the modern literature, the development of character (e.g. Grant 2011; 
Sandel 2012; Sedláček 2011; Sen 1997) and capacities or ‘capabilities’ (Nussbaum 
2011; Sen 2001) are again highlighted as the highest human goal. The real need 
of human beings, perhaps especially of those whose material needs have been 
satisfied, is the fulfilment of higher goals in life, particularly the development of 
such higher capacities as morality, creativity and a mode of self-actualisation 
39See, for instance, Pack (2010a, 2010b, 2008, 1985), Solomon (2004, 1993), Ghoshal (2005), cheffers and 
Pakaluk (2007), Giovanola (2009), Page (2010), Sison (2010), Houghton Budd (2011), Sedláček (2011), 
Giovanola and fermani (2012).
40Such as pleasure, or ‘happiness for the greatest number’, as in Jeremy Bentham’s interpretation of Hobbes 
(1651)’s and locke (1689)’s pleasure-pain psychology.
41for a fundamental defence of this aristotelian understanding of the realm of life, of living beings, see 
mulder (2016).
42Typically, the development of a virtuous character understood along aristotelian lines consists in doing 
what such a character would commend – for example, one develops a just (or courageous, or friendly) 
character by doing just (or courageous, or friendly) deeds.
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that includes responsibility for others. If, therefore, the motive to develop men-
tally, to realise one’s intellectual, creative and moral potential, in a word, to 
develop ‘character’, is taken seriously, how can the economy and technology 
contribute to its realisation?
If human life has a telos, a state of fulfilment or completion, then so, too, will 
the modern economy and its essential expression – capital. Within the econom-
ics profession of the last ninety years, perhaps no one has expressed this more 
clearly than Keynes who, for example in his 1930 essay Economic possibilities 
for our grandchildren, hinted at qualities of life beyond material existence – 
suggesting, indeed, that these are more ‘real’ than the struggle for material exist-
ence itself. Economist Robert Skidelsky and philosopher Edward Skidelsky (2012) 
draw attention to Keynes’s Aristotelian underpinnings – especially the idea that 
‘we cannot … do fine actions if we lack resources’ (Skidelsky 2009: 134). For 
Aristotle, the purpose of the economy is to generate the material conditions 
that enable the human being to do ‘fine actions’.
It is in these terms, ultimately, that Keynes understood ‘the economic prob-
lem’. Taking this argument to its completion requires a debate between the 
human telos and the normative foundations of conventional economic theory. 
As we have tried to explain above, this will include rethinking some of the most 
fundamental questions of economics, in particular regarding the nature and 
purpose of capital. It will also involve finding an alternative to the pursuit of 
private gain as the basis of decision-making and our economic and social order 
(Hirschman 1997).
5. Two concepts of freedom – or making visible the ‘invisible 
hand’
Freedom to choose between alternative socio-economic trajectories becomes a 
possibility only when capital is liberated from the Benthamite43 or Friedmanite 
compulsion to maximise personal gain, so that it becomes free to serve two 
purposes – material and non-material – rather than one. However, this raises 
a problem. If capital is no longer guided by a single, unambiguous principle – 
profit maximisation – how are decisions about capital allocation to be made? Are 
not the preferences of individuals often diametrically opposed to each other? 
Will not hell break loose?
The consciousness of every individual is indeed limited – an argument raised 
by the neoclassical school as well as by Hayek (1945), von Mises (1949 [1998]) 
and other members of the Austrian school in favour of markets − and not with-
out reason. According to the Austrian school, even the imperfect markets of the 
43according to Bentham (1781), not only is human behaviour, as a matter of fact, dictated by the pursuit 
of pleasure and avoidance of pain; in order to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number, it 
should be so dictated. This is Bentham’s way of grounding moral requirements in something other than 
human telos.
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real world44 are more suited to dealing with the unlimited amount of information 
required to understand and manage the economic process than any lone indi-
vidual, whose knowledge and ability to comprehend will always be too limited 
to be able to oversee the whole. It is on these grounds that markets are said to 
be the best solution to the problem of economic order when that order is far 
too complicated to be grasped by individual consciousness.
And yet proof that decentralised use of knowledge and pursuit of self-inter-
est will automatically generate equilibrium has never been given (e.g. Schlefer 
2012).45 For the neoclassical school, the solution is to assume a ‘representative 
individual’ or ‘central planner’ who ‘solves’ the coordination problem. However, 
the disadvantages of centralised planning are also evident.
Both approaches – decentralised decision-making and coordination – have 
their weaknesses but also their strengths, so could not the strengths of both – 
the individual initiative associated with the market and the coordination that is 
conventionally entrusted to the state – be combined while their weaknesses are 
avoided? Could the consciousness that is required be that of non-collusively col-
laborating individuals working together to supplement and complement their 
different perspectives (Houghton Budd 2011)? Bringing together the knowl-
edge of well-informed individuals could, in principle, enhance economic life. 
The Austrian and neoclassical schools reject this possibility; but they do so from 
the point of view of self-interested and identical, ‘representative’ individuals 
who meet each other at random (Kirman 1992). However, in reality, individuals 
acquire different kinds of knowledge as they enter the worlds of production, 
trade and consumption. Since it is hard if not impossible for a single individual 
to understand economic conditions from all these perspectives simultaneously, 
individuals communicate with each other to complement and attune each oth-
er’s views and perspectives.
Thus, an image emerges of economic solutions reached through associations 
(Houghton Budd 2011) of individuals who come to judgements via a sum total 
of intelligence arrived at by looking at economic phenomena from different 
perspectives, resulting in ‘deliberate choices’ and ‘spontaneous conformity’ 
(Lowe 1988) − as distinguished from decisions enforced from outside, such as, 
conventionally, through either the ‘discipline of the market’ or coercion by the 
state. As informed decisions reached in many small groups operating in a subset 
of the economy ‘propagate through the economy’ (Kirman 1992), it may well 
be that ‘the evolution of such an economy, … [consisting of ] many interacting 
heterogeneous agents … may be relatively stable’ (Kirman 1992).
44in contrast to the neoclassical school, which assumes perfect markets, the austrian school acknowledges 
that markets produce crisis from time to time.
45after arrow and Debreu (1954)’s proof of the existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy, 
Sonnenschein (1972), mantel (1974), Debreu (1974), Hahn (1984) and more recently Kirman (1989, 1992) 
have shown that, for a perfectly competitive economy, proof of a spontaneous convergence towards a 
unique equilibrium cannot be given. See also Rizvi (2006), offer and Söderberg (2016: 27).
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Still, there will be many occasions where views and opinions differ and where 
it is hard to reach consensus. Indeed, ‘non-conformity [is] a source of emancipa-
tory progress’ and ‘some degree of disorder is the price of autonomous individ-
uation, and thus of genuine emancipation’ (Lowe 1988: 12, 13). Such situations, 
we propose, require two things.
First, discipline is required on the part of each individual to take into account 
the interest of others in addition to one’s own interest. This will include the 
discipline to ‘educate one’s desires’ (Keynes, quoted in Skidelsky 2009) which 
requires, in Aristotle’s terms, ‘character’. From Aristotle onwards, freedom from 
constraints on one’s behaviour – freedom in the negative sense – has been 
contrasted with freedom or liberty in the positive sense: the freedom to act in 
responsible or humane ways (Berlin 2002). This, however, requires emancipation 
from the mere drive to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, and grounding actions 
on self-gained insight as to what is responsible or humane – insight, that is, into 
the telos of humankind.
Second, as part of this exercise, the individual will need a theory or guidelines 
that provide grounds for judgements concerning responsibility. Wider concepts 
of capital and freedom would not be complete without such a theory, a first 
sketch of which is given next.
6. Judging innovations in ICT on the basis of Aristotle’s golden 
mean
Assuming for the time being that we widen our understanding of capital, thus 
permitting freedom of choice, so that we are no longer bound to one location 
on the technology continuum – the one that coincides with maximisation of 
shareholder value – how do we discern and, subsequently, choose between 
responsible and irresponsible innovation (and their correspondences in capital 
allocation)?
The basis for such a choice will be a full conception of the end or telos of 
human life. Developing such a conception is, indeed, part of the purpose of 
human life itself. After all, as Aristotle wrote, human beings long to understand – 
themselves, as well as the world they find themselves in.46 Taking Aristotelian 
eudaimonia (as explained in Section 4) as our point of departure, this is, however, 
not as straightforward a matter as it might seem. For one thing, realising eudai-
monia is a very open-ended matter: the particular articulation of skills, virtues 
and understanding that you or I are aiming for may differ greatly, depending 
on the various talents and capabilities each of us has, and on the choices we 
individually make.
Moreover, per Aristotle, happiness does not consist in maximising each of its 
components but in balancing them – here we are approaching Aristotle’s famous 
46aristotle (2012).
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doctrine of the ‘golden mean’. The human telos is a rich and complex but unitary 
matter: every one of its elements intrinsically depends on all the others. Let us 
take generosity and justice as two examples of such elements: it is clear that 
maximising generosity without developing justice will not result in a better life. 
Being generous in an unjust way is, in fact, a recipe for trouble.47
Something similar holds for the elements of happiness internally. A virtue like 
generosity does not consist in, say, maximising giving one’s possessions away, 
but in giving appropriate amounts in the right circumstances to the right people. 
And that entails Aristotle’s concept of the ‘golden mean’. In Aristotle’s own words:
finding [the mean] is difficult, especially in particular cases, since it is not easy to 
determine how one should be angry, with whom, for what reasons, and for how 
long; indeed we sometimes praise those who fall short and call them even-tem-
pered, and sometimes those who flare up, describing them as manly. … This much, 
then, is clear – that the mean state is in every case to be praised, but that some-
times we must incline towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency, 
because in this way we shall most easily hit the mean, namely, what is good. 
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.9, 1109b14-29)
In search of the ‘golden mean’, one navigates the space between two extremes. 
This navigation has little to do with calculation; it is in essence a qualitative kind 
of estimation. It does not aim instrumentally at some fixed quantity (such as 
shareholder value, or overall utility), but rather aims at being in accord with the 
whole of human nature – that is, with eudaimonia.48
The norms that guide our decisions reside, according to this Aristotelian 
view, in our very nature. But not only in our own nature: given our capacity for 
insight in the natures and telos of the things and phenomena around us, we 
can come to understand what would be in accord with their natures, too, and 
act accordingly. It is, of course, not at all easy to arrive at genuine insight into 
the nature of anything, perhaps least of all into our own nature, and hence here 
again there is no basis for a fool-proof calculation that will tell us what to do. 
Still, we should take our striving for understanding seriously. And that holds 
47Strictly speaking, then, it is impossible to develop generosity without justice; being generous in an unjust 
way is simply not being generous at all. or, as anscombe (1993: 153) writes, ‘helping your neighbours 
is doing well [i.e. eudaimonia], but killing someone for them is not helping them’. These observations 
illustrate the way in which the elements of the human telos are interdependent. See also Rödl (2007) 
and wiggins (2009).
48a defender of utility maximisation might argue that all this can be included in the utility function – reflect-
ing that the individual attaches high utility to, say, acts that are courageous, generous or just. This, however, 
effectively treats objective measures of goodness as brute, subjective preferences (‘ah, you prefer generous 
acts? nice. i personally prefer apple pie over generosity’.), thus tacitly distorting the logical character of 
those ‘preferences’ as elements of eudaimonia. aristotelian freedom is thereby excluded: maximising utility 
does not leave room for genuine choice, since the utility derived from one good can always be traded for 
the utility given by another, beyond moral commitment. This philosophical point also raises questions of 
(neoclassical) economic methodology. Do the mathematical properties of the neoclassical model permit 
commitment to moral values? in the neoclassical model, individuals substitute smoothly between goods 
in response to relative prices, thus maintaining the mathematical properties of the (convex, continuous, 
monotone) utility function; it is not possible to always prefer good A over good B for moral reasons (or 
‘commitment’; Sen 1977, 1997) independently of relative price movements, for ‘[if ] non-convexities are 
allowed … then the existence of an equilibrium is no longer certain’ (ackerman 2002).
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also for our approach to the economy and technology as such: in this case, our 
striving for a clear understanding of their nature is ineluctably tied to our own.
Let us now apply this Aristotelian understanding of choice to our problem 
of choosing which direction technology and innovation should take. Without 
doing justice to the various perspectives on the relationship between techno-
logical development and human development we may, perhaps, distinguish 
two extreme positions. On the one hand, those who view the human being as 
an autonomous being with inherent capacities such as rationality and freedom, 
warn against possible destructive effects of technology on the human mind and 
its creations: culture, science, morality, autonomy. Taking such warnings to the 
extreme leads to Luddism. On the other hand, those who are prone to view man 
as a being who has always been shaped by his own technical instruments and 
artefacts, see in the new technologies exciting new chances for the evolution of 
the human being (as they see this). In the extreme, this leads to unquestioned 
optimism concerning every new technological possibility.
Thus we have identified the relevant extremes: Luddism, or a rejection of 
everything that smacks of technology for its own sake, on the one hand, and an 
unquestioned embracing of every new technological possibility on the other – 
extremes we may perhaps, respectively, call technophobia49 and technophilia.50 
When we recall relevant considerations and observations concerning the nature 
of the economy and technology shared in earlier sections, it is easy to see what 
is wrong with these two extremes, just as in the case of generosity we can see 
what is wrong with wastefulness and avarice. Technophobia forgets the role tech-
nology plays in freeing human beings from the need to work (only) for material 
existence, thus enabling them to develop their potentialities in other directions 
more fully. Technophilia forgets the dangers to which excessive automation of 
human social and mental life give rise. It is not easy, of course, to arrive at the 
‘golden mean’ in this case. It requires a much deeper understanding of social 
reality at large and in particular of the role of the economy and technology 
within that reality. In short, it requires a broad vision of society.
Since each shared vision starts with a vision at the level of the individual, how, 
then, do we come to an individual judgement? Here we reach the main point of 
this paper: while we need to come to a judgement as to the right direction for 
technological development, both individually and collectively, we lack the pos-
sibility of properly engaging with it, since, as noted earlier, the normative basis 
of contemporary economic theory denies us a choice. What we need, therefore, 
is an understanding of what it takes for the issue to be properly treated.
We emphasise that this requires, first of all, a setting that leaves or even 
deliberately creates room for such judgements and choices to be made. This 
means that solutions are neither predetermined nor excluded by the views of 
49e.g. Sale (1995), Kaczynski (2010).
50e.g. Kurzweil (2006, 2012).
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others – such as the normative prescriptions of any particular economic theory. 
A second condition for an adequate judgement on the direction of technolog-
ical development is the following: it should secure that in future such room for 
exploring the technology continuum remains available. It may (or may not) turn 
out that extra measures are required, in parallel with technological development 
as envisaged, in order to maintain that dialectical space. At any rate, it requires 
enabling people to acquire and maintain the cognitive, social and other skills 
and capacities necessary to make such judgements and choices.
Our suggested theoretical basis for deciding which course technological 
development should take thus diverges sharply in its methodology from the 
decision-making that standard economic theory avers.51
Interestingly, however, there is a structural similarity between the Aristotelian 
and the utilitarian views. One could posit the utilitarian view as a species of 
Aristotelianism, albeit one that singles out but one aspect of human life – the 
psychological experiences of pleasure and pain – to the exclusion of all other 
aspects, yielding a highly watered down, reductionist conception of the end of 
human life. The Aristotelian conception, by contrast, is inclusive: it does not thus 
restrict our understanding of the human being. However, and most importantly, 
the utilitarian approach in fact eclipses the Aristotelian mode of thought in terms 
of balancing between two extremes, and replaces it with a one-dimensional 
opposition of pleasure (good) vs. pain (bad), which leads to a distorted, linear 
understanding of progress as the maximisation of pleasure (e.g. in the form of 
maximising shareholder value).
The utilitarian approach does not take the full nature of the human being 
into consideration, and thereby invites oppositions, such as market vs. state, 
or economics vs. ethics. By positing such oppositions and discussing how the 
apparent opposites can be reconciled or connected, one is attempting to marry 
a restricted, reductionist utilitarian understanding with something one (rightly) 
finds is missing from it. But that will make only for a shotgun wedding at best.52 
The point is that one thereby fails to make the shift from a restricted, dualistic 
utilitarian understanding of the aim of human life towards an encompassing 
understanding in terms of balancing, of finding the ‘golden mean’. When we do 
make that shift, our understanding of economic life and technology will need 
to be rethought in order to fit the newly gained broader understanding of the 
aim of human life. (Conversely, when we understand economic life and the 
51This is true even if, upon reflection, the course we decide for future technological development happens 
to coincide with what economic theory would have enforced. for the reasons we mentioned this appears 
to be a theoretical possibility only.
52for example, given the prevailing financial and social order, labour-saving technological progress leads to 
exclusion. To remedy this problem, e.U. policy documents call for inclusion. But with unchanged economic 
theory, this leads to attempts to reconcile the ‘inclusive society’ with maximisation of shareholder value 
(also outside the economy proper, i.e. the material economy). The result is marginalisation, i.e. the inclu-
sion of people in terms of jobs, but at declining remuneration and deteriorating employment conditions 
(see Hassel 2011; Storm and naastepad 2015).
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workings of capital in this new way we will find ourselves making, or indeed 
having made, that shift.)
When assessing developments in ICT, there are clear signs that thoroughgo-
ing consideration of their resultant products, services and possibilities is required 
in order to determine which of these genuinely further eudaimonia (however 
sketchy our understanding of it is), and which of these do not, or may even 
prove harmful to it. In Section 2 above, we mentioned a few prominent writers 
from the domain of ICT development itself who voice worries in this direction. 
It is therefore likely, we should note, that the result of such assessments, on the 
Aristotelian basis we promote, will often be a nuanced one – neither downright 
condemnation, nor unquestioned glorification.
Freedom in choosing the direction of technological change may lead to a 
better understanding of where technology is appropriate and where it is not, 
and to a different degree and use of technology in different spheres, that is, to 
sphere-appropriate technology. An understanding of economic life that looks 
beyond the norms of one-dimensional utilitarianism will have room for such 
considerations. Moreover, it will be forceful enough to implement the conclu-
sions arrived at in economic practice. That is to say, it will be in a position to 
implement technological innovations to the extent that they are indeed in line 
with further cultural development, along with the possibility for all human 
beings involved to live well.
7. Conclusion
What explains the discrepancy between goals that are deemed responsible, in 
particular an ‘inclusive and sustainable society’, and developments in ICT that 
reduce the likelihood of attaining them?
We have suggested that it is due to a conflict between social objectives and 
the normative prescriptions of conventional economic theory grounded in a 
narrow (utilitarian) concept of freedom. Realisation of ‘inclusive and sustainable 
society’ requires a wider (Aristotelian) understanding of freedom, responsibility 
and capital centred on furthering the non-material aspects of life in addition to 
meeting material needs.
Freedom of choice with respect to the direction of technological change and 
the ‘inclusiveness’ of society will remain an illusion unless capital is permitted to 
take on a dual role − as ‘financier’ of physical production and enabler of further 
non-material human evolution. This wider understanding of freedom, capital 
and human life will permit individuals to give direction to, rather than being 
directed by, technological change.
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